Abstract Attention to security aspects has increased rapidly in the current century by both academic researchers and companies offering security services and solutions, as a result for an increased attacks number on network infrastructure worldwide. Therefore, some techniques have emerged that can mitigate the effects of the attack and improve the ability of networks to detect attackers and prevent attacks. Software Defined Network (SDN) is considered one of the prominent techniques in general. SDN is emerging to enhancement existing protocols and networks architecture, in addition, to adding more simplicity for managing the networks. The proposed approach is depending on SDN features to detect and mitigate ARP storm attacks in Local Area Networks (LAN) without needing to change ARP packet, change the existing hardware or forcing hosts to install specific patch or application. Several scenarios applied to demonstrate the ability of the proposed approach in detecting the sources of storm attacks and protect both network devices and hosts from the effect of ARP storm attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid advancement in networking technologies has enabled a wide variety of application with diverse requirements on network services. Such diverse requirements and dynamic network services bring in new challenges to service provisioning in future networks. Security challenges in the light of this remarkable progress are so great that they focus on meeting future challenges and addressing past gaps. Some protocols are designed to suit a network environment that is radically different from today's network environment, so many gaps in its design or operation today. All these encouraged the attackers to penetrate networks or devices for the purpose of dropping the network or access to the data. This called on researchers, organizations interested in technology and even companies to focus and attention on the security aspects.
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). ARP [1] is one of the simplest and most dynamic protocols operate between layer two and layer three in OSI model. ARP has always been regarded as the key part of communication. In principle, ARP is responsible for mapping physical and logical addresses of network devices. However, ARP contains a lot of vulnerabilities that can be exploited to attack devices or networks in more than one attack image (ARP Storm, ARP Spoofing). Also, the ARP vulnerabilities can use as the first stage to another attack like (DoS, DDoS, and MITM) [2] . This is mainly due to the gaps in the design and operation of ARP protocol, where it lacks many characteristics such as verification and reliability making it an easy to penetrate protocol by attackers.
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a new significant innovation in networking that is expected to address network challenges. SDN introduces the concept of programming networks in wide network architecture. The main idea of SDN architecture is physical separating between data plane and control plane by adding center device (i.e. SDN controller). SDN controller is representing the control plane, while data plane is represented by SDN switches. Consequently, separating planes and network programming are adding a lot of ease and simplicity to the management of networks [3] .
The proposed approach is based on the characteristics of SDN to detect and mitigate ARP storm attacks, which rely heavily on the weaknesses of the ARP protocol. In principle, the proposed approach is proposed two algorithms, the first algorithm is responsible for collecting and building an updated local database. The second algorithm is responsible for packet analysis techniques and makes decisions based on a local database built in algorithm one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the operation of ARP and ARP storm attacks. Section III describes the methodology of algorithms used to detect and mitigate ARP storm attacks. Section IV presents the experiment scenarios and simulation environment. Finally, result and discussion present the result of each experiment.
II. BACKGROUND
Three level of addressing added to three data header in three different layers. Port address, IP address, and MAC address added in the transport layer, network layer, and datalink layer respectively. Table-1 illustrates the difference between all address levels. In general, at least a host needs to know two levels of addresses (i.e., IP and MAC addresses) in order to transmit packets to another host. Therefore, a host possesses a table called ARP Cache Table to store all the MAC addresses for other hosts in the network for a specific period of time depending on operating system, which in general ranges from one to five minutes [4] . Table to search for MAC address of Host-C, and if it is unsuccessful (i.e., Host-C MAC address is not listed in the table) Host-A will send ARP request packet to Host-C asking for its MAC address. In principle, ARP request is a broadcast packet which means it will be disseminated and reached to all hosts in the network domain. Once receiving the ARP request packet from Host-A, only Host-C will reply by sending ARP reply packet while the other hosts will neglect the ARP request.
The attacker or malicious host exploits a feature of ARP request to flood the network with an enormous amount of unnecessary packets. In such ARP flood or ARP storm attack, network devices like (switches) redirects broadcast packets directly to all ports except for incoming ports, which leads to several issues such as consuming the bandwidth of network links, slow network connection, and consumption the CPU and memory for network hosts. Moreover, it can be used as the first stage to launch more malicious attacks such as DoS and DDoS. Fig. 2 illustrates the ARP storm attack scenario that occurs in LAN topology. 
III. PROPOSED METHODS
The proposed approach consists of two algorithms to detect and prevent ARP storm attacks. The first algorithm is responsible for collecting information and building local database depending on ARP and DHCP packets. The second algorithm adapts detection and mitigation from ARP storm attacks. Any host in a network can be assigned IP address by using two methods, namely manual method, and automatic method. The manual method is carried out by network administrator where the host will be assigned with static IP address whereas the automatic method is done when the host obtained an IP address from DHCP server. Therefore, during boot up operation the host must send one type of the packet according to the aforementioned configuration method, either ARP gratuitous packet if it uses the manual method or DHCP Discover packet if it uses the automatic method. Consequently, SDN controller will send flow rule to OpenFlow switches to forward ARP and DHCP packet to the controller, where the controller will extract important information like IP, MAC, Port No, and Switch ID from these packets to build a local database (hash tables). Here each table stores the information in Key and Value like (IP: MAC, Port No., and SW ID). Fig. 3 illustrates the process of the proposed approach.
The first algorithm already has been proposed to collect and build database tables in some recent works such as [5] , [6] and [7] . The researchers are assumed that the first algorithm will receive correct information from hosts. In this work, the same algorithm was used in addition to increase the number of tables. Therefore, the proposed approach will contain more information about all hosts and devices. Consequently, the proposed approach will be added updated tables for attackers sources.
Initially, the proposed approach will receive ARP and DHCP packets from OpenFlow switches. Therefore, the proposed approach from ARP gratuitous packets and DHCP ACK packets will be extracted hosts information such as (IP address, MAC address, Switch ID, Port No.) and it will store these information in Host-Info table (Line 4 to 10 - Fig.4 .). Moreover, the proposed approach from OpenFlow state reply messages will be extracted switches information like (Switch ID, Switch Ports No., a Switch Ports MAC address) and it will store these information in Switches table (Line 2 to 4- Fig.5 ). In addition to, the proposed approach will monitor DHCP release packets and also send Flow rule to OpenFlow switches to forward ports information to SDN controller if the ports become shut down to ensure the correctness and updating of local database information. Fig. 4 and 5 illustrate part A and B of Algorithm-1.
The second algorithm is responsible for detecting attacks since it relies on the local database table built by the first algorithm. Where the proposed approach enables the ARP proxy features to reply to ARP requests. When the host sends an ARP request packet, the OpenFlow switches redirects it directly to SDN controller, for its part SDN examines the request and then replies to it based on the SDN local database (hash tables). In general, each ARP request packets are encapsulated in Ethernet [8] frame and consist of source and destination address in addition to another information. Therefore, the detection part of the second algorithm applies two level of examination on the packet before replying to the ARP request. The first one is for checking the source address of ARP request packet of the sender, while the second one is for checking the destination address of ARP request packet. The attacker will be immediately detected if the source address of ARP request packet does not exist in the local database. On the other hand, if the destination address of the ARP request packet is also not present in the local database, the sender will be considered as the possible attacker. In the case of both source and destination addresses of ARP request packets exist in the local database, the SDN controller will respond by sending a reply message through the ARP proxy feature based on the local database information. Meanwhile, the mitigation part tries to protect the SDN controller and hosts from the impact of ARP storm. Detection part classifies the requests into three types (attacker request, suspect request, and normal request); the mitigation part focuses on attacker request and suspect request. Therefore, two hash tables namely Attack Source Storm and Potential Hosts are created to store attacker and suspect host information respectively. The entries of these tables will be erased according to predefined period, i.e., 30 minutes and 1 minute for Attack Source Storm and Potential Hosts respectively, where it's impossible to store attackers information forever. In this case, the SDN controller contains information of all hosts in addition to the attacker and suspect hosts information.
The Algorithm-2 is illustrated in Figure 6 . In principle, whenever the source IP of ARP request packet does not exist in the Host-info table (i.e. for the trusted local database), it indicates that the packet is sent from untrusted sources. The algorithm then checks the availability of the MAC address in Ethernet header of the ARP request (line 24 - Fig 6) . If it does not exist, the MAC address will be inserted into Attack Source Storm table (Line 33 -Fig 6) . If the MAC address is available in the table, SDN controller sends flow rule to OpenFlow switch to drop future broadcast traffic from the untrusted host directly for time period according to number of attempts i.e., 300 seconds, 600 seconds, 900 seconds for first, second and third or more than attempts respectively (Line 24 to 31- Fig 6) . In contrast, the second case when the destination IP of ARP request packet does not exist in Host-info table. Nevertheless, ARP request packet had to bear two possibilities, firstly it sent from the attacker host, secondly, it sent from the legitimate host. Therefore, it is difficult to judge this type of packets from the first time. As a result, the algorithm checks MAC address in Ethernet header of ARP request packet if it exists in the Potential-Host table (Line 6 - Fig 6) and adds it if it does not exist (Line 20 to 22 - Fig 6) . Furthermore, the second algorithm also checks the number of ARP request packets sent by the same host with the wrong destination address. Therefore, it's will depending on a counter variable (P_Con) to count the number of packets according to the conditions listed earlier. In case, the number of received packets is more than the predefined threshold value (PT), the algorithm is considered the source of packet sending is an attacker (Line 7 - Fig 6) . Therefore, it sends flow rule to OpenFlow switch to drop broadcast packets from the host for a time period according to the number of attempts i.e., 180 seconds, 300 seconds, and 900 seconds for first, second and third or more than attempts respectively (Line 8 to 14 - Fig 6) . In other cases, the algorithm is considered the source of packet sending is suspected. Therefore, it only increments the counter variable (Line 15 to 18 - Fig 6) .
IV. EXPERIMENT
From the previous section, it is apparent that ARP storm attack can be initiated by manipulating either or both source and destination addressed of ARP request packet. In order to prove the efficiency and capability of the proposed approach, we consider 4 possible attack scenarios that combine the sender-destination addresses of the ARP packets, as illustrated in Table 2 . In our experiment scenario no. 1 and no. 2 represent Case-1 which is sending ARP packet with an invalid source address (Src-IP) and no. 3 represents Case-2 with the invalid destination address (Dst-IP). Finally, no. 4 represents the normal ARP request packet operation. Only the destination MAC field is still the same in all four scenarios because it contains the broadcast MAC address. All these scenarios are applied in simulation environment where the Ryu controller [9] is selected as SDN controller and Mininet [10] simulation program is installed on a virtual machine having specifications as illustrated in Table 3 . In addition, Wireshark [11] and Tcpdump [12] network analysis programs are used to capture and record network packets respectively.
The experiment topology is illustrated in Figure-7 where it consists of hosts, OpenFlow switches, and SDN controller. All entities are connected and structured in a tree topology with the depth equal to two and fan-out is increased from 5 to 25 in the normal case (i.e. to show the impact of generating traffic with the increase of host and network devices). The attacker tries to flood the network by sending multi-ARP request packets regardless of packets information. In general, the attacker sends 500 to 2500 ARP request packets with the increase of 500 request packets at each attempt. Table 4 illustrates the experiment details for the four possible ARP attacks as previously discussed and listed in Table 2 . The first experiment represents the normal case when the legitimate host sends one valid ARP request in a Tree topology. The ratio of generated network traffic in both data and control plane measured between default OpenFlow switch and SDN controller, OpenFlow Switch and SDN controller plus ARP Proxy feature, and the proposed approach. Obviously, in Figure-8 the ARP proxy feature with SDN controller can reduce network generated traffic and keep it fixed equal four regardless of the increase in fan-out from 5 to 25 because of OpenFlow switch just forward the requests to the controller and received the reply from it and forward the reply to the host. However, the generated traffic increase in normal OpenFlow switch and SDN controller due to the SDN controller can't reply to ARP request packet and ask OpenFlow switches to flood requests through all ports excepts incoming ports. Therefore, one request is repeated one hundred times in one broadcast domain. Other experiments represent the storm attack of case-1 and case-2, respectively, shown in Figure 9 , 10 and 11. Obviously, from the figures, the attacker sends unnecessarily ARP requests (500 to 2500) have either invalid source address (Experiment two and three - Table 4 ) or invalid destination address (Experiment four - Table 4 ).
In these cases, all requests forward directly to SDN controller if the controller has ARP proxy feature, instead of being replicated inside a network in case the controller does not content ARP proxy feature. However, the proposed approach has detection and mitigation algorithms plus ARP proxy feature. Therefore, it can detect storm attacks and mitigate the attacker impact on the network, furthermore prevent the attacker from accessing to SDN controller. Where the attacker sends 500 packets, the OpenFlow switch receives each packet and forward it to SDN controller. The SDN controller can detect the attack from the first packets reach to it in case storm attack with the invalid source address and after the counter value exceeded the threshold value in case storm attack with the invalid destination address. Therefore, the generation network traffic with proposed approach lower than another method as illustrated in figure 9, 10 and 11. 
VI. CONCLUSION
ARP protocol contains inherent vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited by a malicious attacker. One of the vulnerabilities lies in the form of ARP, where it can be easily exploited to launch ARP storm attacks. Nevertheless, SDN has been introduced to simplify the operation of the network and has been regarded as the de facto technology for future networks. By segregating the data and control plane, SDN clears the complexity in managing the network and can be used in many domains to increase the scalability and availability of current networks.
The proposed approach designed for Software Defined Networking to detect and mitigate ARP storm attacks in Local Area Network. The importance of ARP storm attack is it can use as a first stage to generate more complex attacks such as DoS and DDoS attacks. The proposed approach is taken advantages from the SDN idea by separating each plan (Data and control) and SDN communication messages between SDN controller and OpenFlow switches. In order to get information and build trusted database tables for all network devices and hosts. In addition, the proposed approach also is analyzing ARP packets to detect the ARP storm attacks without adding new equipment, cryptographic packet, change the packages, and install new patch or application.
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